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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits  
In Judicial Elections  
by  
Cami Jones, Master of Science  
Utah State University, 2012  
 
Major Professor: Dr. Damon Cann  
Department: Political Science  
 
State judicial elections are becoming increasingly more expensive in terms of 
overall spending. The growing visibilities of these elections are expectantly followed 
with the support of special interest groups as well as individual contributions. This article 
focuses on judicial campaign contribution limits and there effectiveness in accomplishing 
their original goals. My research will address a variety of state judicial elections as well 
as Supreme Court cases involving the effectiveness of judicial campaign contributions 
have in accomplishing there purpose of reducing overall spending and preventing 
corruption. My hypothesis states that judicial campaign contributions are not effective in 
limiting the overall spending in a judicial election or in preventing corruption of 
individuals.  
 
(48 pages)  
 
 
Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits  4	  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
 I would like to give special thanks Dr. Damon Cann for all the support he has 
provided me in my research process.  I would also like thank all my committee members, 
Dr. Michael Lyons and Dr. Randy Simmons for all your efforts in making this happen.  
 I give special thanks to my parents Sterling Kim and Barbara Jones, friends, 
colleagues and especially my fiancé Kyle Haderlie for their encouragement, moral 
support and patience as I worked through the initial proposal writing to this final 
document. I could not have done it without all of you. 
Cami Jones  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits  5	  
CONTENTS 
 Page 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………….3 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………...4 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………...6 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………….....7 
I. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………….8 
a. Background of Judges, Contributions, Influences……………………….9 
II. PREVIOUS WORK—LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………...12 
III. DATA DESCRIPTION……………………………………………………...13 
a. Current state of Campaign Finance: Who Contributes and How much?.13 
i. Campaign Finance Laws…………………………………………13 
ii. Amount Spent per State/Who Contributes………………………15 
b. Legal Structure/ Federal Standards………………………………………17 
i. Buckley v. Valeo (1976)………………………………………….17 
ii. Massey v. Caperton (2009)………………………………………19 
iii. Citizens United v. FEC (2010) ...………………………………...20 
c. Testing Hypothesis ………………………………………………………22 
i. Hypothesis 1……………………………………………………...22 
1. Evaluation……………………………………………......26 
ii. Hypothesis 2……………………………………………………...26 
IV. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………....29 
a. Public Funding …………………………………………………………..30  
b. Eliminate Judicial Elections………………………………………..........32 
c. Merit Selection …………………………………………………………..33 
d. No Limitations with Full Disclosure………………………………….....33 
V. REFERENCES………………………………………………………………43 
 
 
Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits  6	  
LIST OF TABLES  
 
Table               Page 
 
1 Contributions to Candidates by Sector, 2009-10…………………………....39 
2 Candidates Fundraising 2009-10…………………………………………….40 
3 Average Amount raised Per Candidates/Witko’s Score…………………….41 
4       Relationship between Witko’s Score and quid pro quo exchanges………….42 
Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits  7	  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure               Page  
 
1 Candidate Fundraising by Type of Election, 2009-10…………………………..37 
2  Map of the U.S. according to Witko’s Contribution Restrictiveness…………....38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits  8	  
Introduction 
Why do Courts matter? 
The United States has one of the most complex judicial systems in comparison to 
other developed nations. The judiciary ranges from various levels of federal courts down 
to state courts. The U.S. Supreme Court is the most nationally recognized court and 
considered the most powerful by average citizens. However, it is often at the state level 
rather than the federal level, which decisions are made that affect people’s day-to-day 
lives (Cann & Yates, 2008:1).  
State courts are structured differently than federal court system in the United 
States. There are no two state court systems that are exactly alike (Champagne, 2001). A 
major distinguishing factor between state and federal courts and from one state’s court 
system to another that judges are appointed for life (including all federal judges) while 
other judges are either elected or appointed for a limited number of years (Shepherd 
2009:1757). 
Judicial elections have received an increasing amount of attention over the past 
decade. Elections mean money will be spent. Money raises concerns, and contribution 
limits have been enacted to counter those concerns of the increasing amount of money 
spent in elections. But do contribution limits work? My hypotheses address two 
questions: first, do contribution limits decrease the amount of fundraising in judicial 
elections? Second, do contribution limits stop quid pro quo exchanges?  Both of these 
questions help identify the effectiveness of campaign contribution limits in judicial 
elections.  
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Background of Judges, Contributions, Influences 
In the United States each state has an individual court system. Although there are 
similarities across the states they all run independently according to their own state 
constitution. The main purpose of state courts is to hear criminal and civil cases (State 
Courts, 2005) but state courts are also given the power of judicial review and have the 
responsibility to interpret the state constitution and statutes. The federal Supreme Court 
sets precedent regarding federal law that must be followed by trial and appellate courts 
within each state (Supreme Court, 2012). 
 Each state has different regulations and selection processes for judges. Shepherd 
(2009:624) states “recent trends in judicial elections—elections becoming more 
contested, competitive, and expensive—may have upset the delicate balance between 
judicial independence and accountability.” State courts are incredibly important for a 
number of reasons. “More than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business is 
handled by state courts” (Shepherd, 2009:625). Decisions made by state courts directly 
affect individuals across the country. Cann and Yates reference various scholars that 
conclude the majority of judicial policy-decisions across the nation take place in state 
courts (Cann & Yates, 2008). These scholars describe the significance of state courts, 
noting that they handle a substantially larger number (nearly 3 times the amount) of cases 
than federal courts (Baum, 1990:24, Glick, 1993:38).  
 
While it is true that state courts process a whole host of 
routine matters, they also handle some of the most volatile 
and salient issues of the day, such as gay civil unions, the 
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death penalty, and equality rights in public school financing 
(Carp, Stidham and Manning, 2004). Furthermore, in 
certain instances, state courts have extended citizens’ civil 
liberty rights (under state constitutional provisions) beyond 
those afforded by the Supreme Court under the U.S. 
Constitution (Latzer, 1991) (Cann &Yates, 2008:3).  
 
 
Judges responsible for making such crucial decisions should be selected carefully.  
Hall addressed the idea of selecting judges and contends that voters select the best judges 
because elected judges are independent from the legislature and executive branch (Hall, 
1984). Unlike legislators, who represent specific constituents, state judges pledge to 
follow a strict code under the American Bar Association (ABA) intended to restrict any 
type of bias or impartiality toward an outside person or group (ABA, 2007). 
 Citizens are limited in their ability to influence judges because of the ABA 
restrictions.  One action that individuals may undertake is to submit amicus curiae briefs, 
providing special information to the court. This individual may not be the plaintiff or 
defendant in the case and is only permitted to point out legal considerations that the Court 
may not have otherwise considered (Amicus, 2012).  For individuals who are not a party 
to a case, amicus curiae briefs are the only legal means by which they can gain the 
attention of the court. These briefs may raise issues, not already addressed by the parties 
of the case but that may be helpful to the court (Supreme Court Rules, 2011).  
While the methods of formal influence on courts are limited, interested 
individuals and groups may indirectly influence courts by influencing the composition of 
courts. One way this occurs is through electioneering in states that select their judges in 
contestable elections. Elections, and particularly campaign finance, open the door for 
potential undue influence on judges.  
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Because of possible corrupting influences, ethical standards are set by the 
American Bar Association for each judge to follow. Among these standards is a 
particularly important dictum that states, “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a 
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (Goldberg, 
2007). This rule in particular distances judges from any type of outside influence or bias 
or any form.  
While there is very little room for outside groups and organizations to influence 
judges, there may be ways to circumvent these limitations through campaign contribution 
and electioneering. Campaign contributions have become a necessity in today’s election 
process. Candidates typically fund their entire campaign using contributions from 
individual donors and political parties (Skaggs, Silva, Casey & Hall, 2011).  
Bonneau (2005) makes note of similarities between judicial and legislative 
campaign contributions. Both candidates use contributions to “gain support, challenge 
incumbents, and launch effective campaigns” (Bonneau, 2005). In studying legislative 
campaign contributions, Erickson and Palfrey find that there is a comparable relationship 
between campaign contributions and the votes of congressional representatives (Erikson 
& Palfrey, 1998).  This finding makes it natural to wonder if a similar relationship exists 
between the rulings of judges and the campaign contribution they receive.  
Campaign finance laws, which control contribution limits, vary from state to state 
(Witko, 2005). Such limits were put in place with the stated purpose of two goals: First, 
to indirectly reduce overall campaign spending and second, to limit corruption within the 
courtroom. The goal of campaign finance laws sets the foundation to my research 
question and hypothesis; campaign contribution limits do not effectively reduce the 
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overall spending in a campaign or prevent corruption in the courtroom. We move next to 
a comprehensive discussion of the rationale behind contribution limits and their 
effectiveness in judicial elections.  
Literature Review 
 “During the 1990s, thinking about comprehensive campaign finance reform 
shifted toward equalizing political power” (Gross, Goidel & Shields, 2002:9). 
Incumbents particularly have enjoyed a considerable fundraising advantage (Bonneau, 
2005).  Within the past decade, judicial elections have taken campaign fundraising to a 
new level. Judicial candidates have nearly doubled the amount of money collected and 
spent in judicial elections in the past four years (Cann & Yates, 2008:17, Skaggs et al., 
2011:5). Baum and Hojnacki (1992) describe an increase in funding and media coverage 
as a way to better inform voters in a judicial election. Hall and Bonneau (2008) propose 
in their study that increases in funding and campaign advertisements will increase voter 
participation in judicial elections. 
Bonneau and Cann (2009) review a wide range of literature investigating whether 
quid pro quo exchanges do in fact exist between contributors and judges. They looked at 
both partisan and nonpartisan judicial elections and conclude that in some states for 
example of Michigan and Texas a relationship was found. In other states (Wisconsin) 
there was no relationship between contributors and judicial decisions.  
But campaign spending may have more effects than just possible quid pro quo 
exchange influences. Gross, Goidel and Shields (2002) state, campaign contribution 
limits were enacted to achieve a greater degree of electoral competition. Bonneau and 
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Cann (2009) and have found that, the increases in campaign spending have made 
challengers more competitive with incumbents. They maintain that contributions limits 
diminish competitiveness. However, additional opposing arguments hold that unseemly 
campaigns and large expenditures have potential disastrous effects on the legitimacy of 
state high courts  (Cann & Yates, 2008). Many believe this is due to “the appearance of 
quid pro quo exchanges between individuals who support a particular judges campaign” 
(Cann, Bonneau, & Boyea, 2010). At least two things remain unclear in the literature on 
campaign contributions. First, do contributions really level the playing field and reduce 
overall levels of campaign spending? I hypothesize that they do not because candidates 
may still raise as much as they like they just need to raise it from a more people. Second, 
it remains unclear whether contribution limits really resolve the problem of quid pro quo 
exchanges between donors and judges. We move next to a discussion of the general 
campaign finance system and then devise a test that will answer these two questions.  
Current state of Campaign Finance: Who contributes and how much? 
A. Campaign Finance Laws 
Campaign finance laws were put into place to help regulate money spent in a 
campaign and to prevent corruption in the courtroom (Primo, Jacobsmeier & Milyo, 
2004). Different than legislative elections, judges (according to the ABA regulations) are 
to remain impartial and unbiased in all instances. By permitting the acceptance of 
campaign contributions in judicial elections it opens the door to create favoritism or 
partiality towards a specific individual or group.  
In 2001, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White evaluated the constitutionality 
of the Announce Clause (Minnesota v. White, 2001). Under the Announce Clause, 
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judicial candidates were not permitted to announce their views on disputed political or 
legal issues (Hasen, 2007:17). Although the original Announce Clause was dropped from 
the ABA codes by 1990, various versions of the clause, such as the Commit or Appear to 
Commit Clause were established in its place (Hasen, 2007:17). The Court stated in White 
that the Announce Clause violated the First Amendment Right to free speech because it 
restricted judicial candidates’ rights to state their opinion on matters of importance to 
voters (Minnesota v. White, 2001). The Commit or Appear to Commit Clause restricted 
candidates from portraying any type of commitments with respect to how they would rule 
in a particular case (Hasen, 2007:17). A number of states have altered their judicial 
conduct codes in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in White. It is because of the 
removal of the Announce Clause that judicial candidates may state their positions on 
issues. This ability to announce positions may make it easier for judges to win favor with 
specific parties and win their support in the form of both votes and campaign 
contributions. The repeal of the Announce Clause also makes judicial elections more 
similar to legislative elections, making it easily anticipated that campaign contributions to 
judges may have comparable influence to that observed in legislative elections (Erikson 
& Palfrey, 1998).  
There are many different strategies and approaches that have been taken to 
address this issue of corruption and determine the appropriate level of contributions in 
elections. State campaign finance laws vary from state to state depending on their specific 
needs (Primo, Jacobsmeier & Milyo, 2004:4). Christopher Witko identifies and 
categorizes variables that define campaign finance laws and there stringency in each state 
(Witko, 2005). After reviewing his work, it is clear there is great diversity among states 
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in their campaign finance regulations. This variation allows for further research to 
determine the reasoning and effectiveness of these restrictions.  
B. Amount Spent per State/Who Contributes 
 Judicial campaign spending has increased dramatically over the last twenty years. 
Cann, Bonneau, and Boyea (2010) note an 80% increase in spending in contestable 
judicial elections between 1990 and 2008. Candidates rely heavily on interest groups and 
individual contributors to obtain the funds necessary to run for political office. This 
spending is often concentrated in a few states, though; Skaggs et al., (2011:5) show that 
nine of the twenty-two states (Cann & Yates, 2008:7) that hold contestable judicial 
elections account for 90% of the money raised by candidates in state high court elections.  
The dramatic uptick in campaign spending led former Solicitor General Ted 
Olson, to declare "there is a financial arms race in judicial elections” (Biskupic, 2009). 
Spending in 2009-2010 state Supreme Court elections reached nearly $38.4 million 
(Skaggs et al., 2011:5). According to the Brennan Center for Justice, “nationally, nine 
states accounted for $24.6 million of the $27.02 million raised by state high court 
candidates (Skaggs et al., 2011:5).   
The Brennan Center for Justice shows the division between spending and 
fundraising per candidate in partisan and non-partisan elections.  
 
Figure 1: About Here 
 
The diagram shows that in partisan elections candidates collect nearly three times 
the dollar amount that a non-partisan election candidate receives. The graph also shows 
partisan races collected almost six times the dollar amount judicial retention elections 
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collected (although my focus is on partisan and non-partisan it is very interesting to see 
the comparison of all judicial elections). This figure shows that partisan elections play a 
substantial role in fundraising efforts, specifically involving political parties whom 
support candidates.  
 Looking further into whom these contributors are, the Brennan Center has divided 
contributors into ten subgroups with the amount contributed per sector for the 2009-2010 
judicial election.  
Table 1: About Here 
These data illustrate why concern abounds regarding corruption in judicial 
elections. As you can see from the table, when contributors are broken down into sectors, 
lawyers and lobbyists led with $8.5 million in donations, followed by businesses with 
$6.2 million.  Political parties rank third largest in donations at $3.4 million. There have 
been large contributions to judicial candidates from both ends of the political spectrum. 
These individuals have clear interests in influencing the outcomes of court cases. If the 
three largest groups of contributors are those facing judges most frequently, it is easily 
perceived that there is influence (Abrahamson, 2001).  
It is also important to recognize that although this table identifies the top spenders 
in the 2009-10 judicial elections, it fails to account for independent expenditures. 
Independent expenditures by special interest groups and state parties were substantially 
larger in the 2009-10 judicial elections than in the previous four years. “Such independent 
activities accounted for $11.5 million, or 29.8 percent of all money spent to elect high 
court justices. In 2005-06, outside groups represented about 18 percent of the total 
spending” (Skaggs et al., 2011:5).  
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The significance of this data is that with in the last decade the amount of money 
and the sources of that money have changed dramatically. “Campaign fundraising more 
than doubled, from $83.3 million in 1990–1999 to $206.9 million in 2000–2009” 
(Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, Casey, 2009). If this pattern continues to progress at the same 
rate, the judicial system may face negative consequences in the form of corruption and 
diminishing legitimacy. Campaign spending is reaching incredibly high levels; therefore 
campaign finance laws are not fulfilling their purpose and need to be reevaluated.  
Table 2: About Here 
 
Given the amount of money involved, the question being asked whether campaign 
contributions limits really achieve the purposes they were intended to achieve.   
Legal Structure/ Federal Standards 
Supreme Court Cases addressing campaign contribution limits and their effectiveness 
 The purpose of campaign contribution limits is clarified by looking at the court 
cases that structure the campaign finance system. Over the years, the Supreme Court 
gradually moved toward a system based on campaign contribution limits. The Supreme 
Court cases evaluated in the paper focus directly on the effects and interpretations of 
campaign finance laws, contribution limits and independent expenditures.   
 
a. Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 
 After the Watergate scandal, Congress made an attempt to limit further corruption 
in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to a candidate (Buckley v. 
Valeo, 1976). The opinion in this case, “limited the amount of money an individual could 
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contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain 
threshold amount” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976).  The Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
was created to enforce this statute, and they continue to be a factor in cases addressing 
similar issues.  
 Two major factors were addressed in the Buckley decision. The first was that 
placing restrictions on individual contributions to candidates did not violate the First 
Amendment right it was, they argued, necessary to achieve the compelling government 
interest in limiting corruption. Secondly, the court concluded that limiting overall 
candidate expenditures (or independent group expenditures) is a restriction of the First 
Amendment right of free speech (Buckley v.Valeo, 1976). It is important to distinguish 
between contribution limits and candidate spending limits in this case. The court 
essentially allowed candidates to raise and spend as much as they wanted, but 
contribution limits require them to raise funds in relatively small increments.  
The Court ruled in Buckley that campaign spending is equivalent to free speech 
under the First Amendment. Therefore, campaign contributions and independent 
expenditures could not be restricted altogether but could be limited in some aspects. 
Buckley v. Valeo led campaign finance jurisprudence down a long and complicated road 
of campaign finance law cases. Nelson (2001:1) comments on the structure that Buckley 
v. Valeo set, in the realm of campaign finance laws and how they are inefficient and are 
simply “laws designed to curb special interest influence are merely hurdles over which 
the adroit player of the system can jump.”  
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The original intent on limitations according to this case was to prevent corruption 
in the political system. Since the Buckley case in 1976, a number of cases have appeared 
in the U.S. Supreme Court addressing similar issues of money being equal to free speech. 
The Court’s decision not to limit overall spending in an election is highly unlikely to be 
revoked in future case, though there may be restrictions on certain types of spending or 
contributions. This decision not only set precedent on campaign contribution limitations 
and independent expenditures but it also clarified why the court instated these laws 
originally: the Court’s goal was to reduce the likelihood of corruption. Later, my analysis 
determines whether or not that goal is being met or if it has adapted to limiting the 
amount of money spent over time due the first goal of preventing corruption.  
 
b. Massey v. Caperton (2009) 
In a more recent case, involving campaign finance laws, A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
Inc. v. Caperton proves to be a critical case in terms of free speech and independent 
expenditures. This decision has forced states to reconsider their campaign finance laws 
and judicial recusal rules (Massey v. Caperton, 2009).  
A state trial court in West Virginia, found Massey liable for $50 million dollars in 
damages for tortuous interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent 
concealment. Mr. Caperton pointed out that Massey’s C.E.O. made $3 million in 
independent expenditures supporting Justice Benjamin’s campaign. Justice Benjamin was 
the deciding vote on a 3-2 ruling in favor of Massey that overturned the $50 million 
judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court called Justice Benjamin’s participation a 
“constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety” (Massey v. Caperton, 2009). 
The court’s decision has potentially tremendous effects on future judicial contests. The 
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Supreme Court held that Justice Benjamin should have recused himself from 
participating in the case involving Massey.  
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy who was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, David 
H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer wrote the majority opinion. The 
Court held that Justice Benjamin actual bias need not be proved to require recusal, only 
“a risk of actual bias” and therefore should have recused himself from the case (Massey v. 
Caperton, 2009). The Court specifically mentioned the large amount of independent 
expenditures that were spent on Justice Benjamin’s campaign and further discussed that 
such a large amount of money calls for recusal of a judge from participating in a case 
(Massey v. Caperton, 2009). 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts writes a dissenting opinion joined with Justice 
Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, arguing that judges need only 
to recuse themselves by merely showing a “probability of bias.” The Court’s vague 
standard opens the door for numerous problems. The Court has seen a variety of cases 
questioning the vagueness of campaign finance laws limiting contributions, adopted in 
Buckley v. Valeo (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976).  
c. Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 
 
The group Citizens United fought against the Federal Election Commission in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to prevent the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) limitations on electioneering communications from 
being applied to the film, Hillary: The Movie (Citizens United v FEC, 2010).  
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The BCRA sets restrictions on corporations and labor unions from funding 
contributions out of their general treasuries (BCRA Section 203, 2002). The BCRA also 
requires the disclosure of donors and disclaimers from each, stating the authorizations of 
the candidate in which it intends to support.  
The Court ruled in favor of Citizens United, claiming that Hillary: The Movie was 
considered expression and intended to inform voters about Senator Clinton. The 
information in the movie was considered constitutional under the First Amendment and 
therefore the Court could not the BCRA sections banning independent expenditures from 
unions and corporations (BCRA, 2002). The Court stated that the disclosure of donors, 
“might be unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular 
cause,” however this was not the case in Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens United v FEC, 
2010).  
The Court’s decision in this case has become critical as judicial election costs 
have increased in recent years. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion 
joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, 
and Clarence Thomas. The majority concluded that political speech is indispensable to a 
democracy, and that speech rights are no less valid because the speech comes from a 
corporation (Citizens United v FEC, 2010). “The majority also held that the BCRA’s 
disclosure requirements as applied to Hillary: The Movie were constitutional, reasoning 
that disclosure is justified by a ‘governmental interest’ in providing the ‘electorate with 
information’ about election-related spending resources” (Citizens United v FEC, 2010).  
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Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion argued that corporations are not members of 
society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations’ ability 
to spend money during local and national elections. Justice Stevens’s argument supports 
the newly adapted goal of campaign contribution limits intended to reduce overall 
spending by limiting the amount large corporations could donate (Citizens United v FEC, 
2010). 
 Citizens United opened the door for corporations to have a tremendous impact on 
judicial elections (as well as national elections) by allowing campaign contributions by 
corporations and labor unions under the First Amendment. These newly defined rights 
gave corporations and labor unions the opportunity to both influence and possibly corrupt 
the state courts. All of these cases help emphasize the importance of my research and 
support my hypothesis that campaign contributions are not effective in accomplishing 
their original goals. 
From Buckley through to Massey and Citizens United, contributions and 
expenditures have become part of the First Amendment right of free speech. This 
equation of money with free speech makes it exceptionally difficult to limit the overall 
amount of money spent in a judicial election. I propose to develop hypotheses to 
determine whether contributions limits reduce the amount of money being spent in 
judicial elections. Additionally, I will explore whether contribution limits reduce 
corruption.  
Testing Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1: Do Contribution limits decrease the amount of fundraising? 
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Donald Gross and Robert Goidel discuss a variety of campaign contribution limits 
enacted throughout the 1990s. They detail specific limitations in each state. They find 
that 42 states limit contributions from labor unions and ban corporate contributions to 
gubernatorial campaigns altogether (Gross & Goidel, 2003). These scholars would agree 
that limiting the cost of campaigns is the motivation behind contributions limits (Gross & 
Goidel, 2003). 
All of the cases we previously considered different motivations behind campaign 
contributions limits. As stated in Buckley v. Valeo, campaign finance laws were created to 
help prevent individual corruption and bias in the courtroom. Over time, corruption came 
to be defined differently in cases such as Citizens United v. FEC. By allowing 
corporation or organizations to fund candidates and label it as “informative to voters” 
opened the doors and changed campaign finance laws and contribution limits by 
classifying them under the First Amendment rights to free speech. Spending can no 
longer be limited through campaign contribution limits. We begin out hypothesis tests 
with a look at the notion that contribution limits may reduce overall levels of spending in 
judicial elections.  
Illustrated in Figure 2 below is a map, identifying all 50 states and the restrictiveness 
according to Witko’s measurement. Witko based his measurement on campaign finance 
restrictions on state statutes. Although this study focuses on only contested judicial 
elections it is interesting to see the overall comparison of campaign contribution 
restrictiveness across the states.  
Figure 2: About Here 
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Many scholars have tested whether contributions have effects on judicial elections 
(Cann, Bonneau & Boyea, 2010, Bonneau, 2005, Williams & Distlear, 2007). However, 
my first hypothesis test focuses on whether or not contribution limits actually limit the 
amount of over all spending in an election. I focus exclusively on contested elections. My 
research breaks down the amount of fundraising dollars in the 2009-10 judicial races and 
compares the average amount of contributions raised per candidate in a state to the level 
of campaign contribution restrictiveness in the state according to Christopher Witko’s 
campaign contribution limit stringency measurement scale (Witko, 2005).  
Witko measures his overall stringency score based on factors from various 
categories including disclosure requirements, public financing and expenditure limits, 
and contribution limits. His index is comprised of 22 individual items, eight items from 
the disclosure requirements, seven items from public financing and expenditures and an 
additional seven items from campaign contribution limits. Each state is given a score 
based off the amount of items that fall under the state statue. A point is awarded for each 
item found in the state statue. The total number from each category is added together to 
equal the overall stringency score. The highest score a state could receive is 22. Arizona 
had the highest overall score reaching 20, meaning they are extremely strict in campaign 
finance regulations. On the other hand Georgia and Mississippi tie for the least stringent 
state at a score of three (Witko, 2005).  
The focus of my research specifically looks at the campaign contribution limits, 
so I focus on Witko’s sub-score for contribution limit stringency. Witko bases his 
campaign contribution limit score off the following seven items (Witko, 2005): 
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1. Contribution limits on individuals 
2. Prohibition of direct corporate contributions  
3. Prohibition of direct labor union contributions  
4. Limits on Corporate contributions (Direct or PACs)  
5. Limits on Labor Union Contributions (Direct of PACs)  
6. Limits on Candidates Self Financing  
7. Limits on Candidate Family Contributions  
For each one of these items that appeared in a statue the state received a point. The higher 
the number, the more stringent the state campaign finance system. The lower the number, 
the less restrictive the state is with campaign finance laws. Witko’s measurement scale is 
sufficient for my research and satisfies the necessary requirements to test my hypothesis. 
Although his data was collected in 2002, state campaign finance statutes (collected by the 
Federal Election Commission), change only rarely and still provide a solid basis to test 
the hypothesis on 2010 campaign contribution date. Differentiating from Witko’s focus, I 
look only at the stringency of contribution limits and the level of money spent per 
election in 2009-10 judicial elections. 
Table 3 arrays a collection of information from 2010 contested judicial elections. 
It includes an arrangement of Witko’s restrictiveness scale and the average amount of 
money raised per candidate (including the number of candidates in each election) in the 
2010 election. The data helps formulate a relationship between the effectiveness of 
restrictions on overall campaign contributions and level of restrictiveness and the amount 
of money collected per candidate in each state. The division of restrictiveness was cut 
between Witko’s scale at the midpoint between three and four. This division makes it 
easier to illustrate the different level of restrictiveness of campaign contribution limits 
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and the average dollar amounts spent per candidate, per election, and recognize the 
correlation between them.   
 
Table 3: About Here 
 
To ensure that the arbitrary choice of dividing the scale between 3/4 does not 
influence results various divisions were made to view different outcomes. No matter 
where we draw the dividing line between restrictiveness, the average for 2010 judicial 
election spending shows the more restrictive a states campaign contribution laws are, the 
more fundraising is done (with the exception of the 4/5 split, the difference actually 
suggests restrictive states spend slightly less, though the difference is not statistically 
significant). The table shows that campaign contribution limits are not doing their 
intended job of limiting the amount of funding collected in contested elections. This 
result could vary when including all state judicial elections, however this study focuses 
on contested judicial elections and the amount of restrictiveness and fundraising. 
Evaluate whether contributions reduce corruption 
Hypothesis 2: Do Contribution limits stop quid pro quo exchanges? 
Edward Keynes states that judges “are men, and they are influenced by the 
communities, the societies and the classes in which they live, and the question now is, not 
whether they shall be influenced at all, . . . but from what quarter that influence shall 
come” (Boston, White & Potter, 1853:773). Along the lines of Keynes, I contend that 
contribution limits alone are not enough to limit corruption in judicial elections.  
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Several scholars have explored whether quid pro quo exchange relationships exist 
between contributors and judges on state supreme courts. Cann (2002) Williams and 
Ditslear (2007) find no systematic evidence supporting a quid pro quo exchange 
relationship between campaign contributors and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s justices.  
In contrast, researchers have proven in a select number of states, such as Michigan, that 
relationships between contributions and judges decisions do exist (Skaggs et al., 2011:11-
12). Michigan Campaign Finance Network’s June 2011 Report states, “the gross failure 
of campaign disclosure in the Michigan Supreme Court campaigns creates a toxic cloud 
that shadows the court’s presumed impartiality” (Skaggs et al., 2011:12). A number of 
other scholars have found that while some states show a quid pro quo exchange 
relationship, others do not.  
According to the second hypothesis, if contribution limits are effective at reducing 
corruption, we should observe corruption in all of the non-restrictive states, but no 
corruption in the highly restrictive states. After reviewing various scholarship, I conclude 
that contribution limits are not successfully fulfilling their intended goals to prevent 
corruption.  
Table 4 illustrates the relationship between the existence of quid pro quo 
exchanges in a state and the level of restrictiveness in that state.  If contribution limits are 
really effective in reducing or preventing quid pro quo exchanges, we should only see 
evidence-supporting corruption in states with few or no campaign contribution limits. 
Table 4: About Here 
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 On its face, the table may appear to not support my hypothesis because Nevada 
and Wisconsin are a “6” on the scale and there is no evidence of exchanges there. Nevada 
and Wisconsin are unusual cases given the culture of state restrictiveness. Nevada has a 
high level or restrictions due to the states gaming industry. Wisconsin on the other hand 
was the founding state during the progressive movement and culturally remains a “Clean 
Politics” state. Both of these states at first glance do not support my hypothesis with a “6” 
Witko score and no evidence of quid pro quo exchanges. However, the evidence of this 
study supports my hypothesis, that contributions limits do not completely prevent quid 
pro quo exchanges.  
The evidence provides mixed results in terms of quid pro quo exchange 
relationships in judicial elections. Quid pro quo exchanges have been demonstrated in 
some instances and not in others. My hypothesis clearly defines corruption, as quid pro 
quo exchanges never being found in any judicial election. The table shows that corruption 
is not being eliminated by campaign contribution limits as originally intended because of 
the literature previously mentioned. We still see corruption in more restrictive states 
proving that campaign contribution limits are not accomplishing their anticipated 
purpose.  
 The second argument that could be made against my hypothesis is that, if there is 
a high Witko score one could assume it to be less likely to see corruption in judicial 
elections; but this is not the case. After review, my analysis shows that restrictions among 
states, according to Witko’s scale and other literature, vary.  Because a number of states 
do not have literature identifying relationships this study is limited to review the states 
that have been researched by scholars. Referring to the Table 4, it shows a variety of 
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relationships. Georgia shows a mixed relationship. Wisconsin does not show a 
relationship with restrictiveness (William & Ditslear, 2007), however Michigan has high 
restrictions and shows a relationship with corruption (Skaggs, et al., 2011:9). Texas has a 
mixture of evidence showing that based off individual justices there is empirical evidence 
of a quid pro quo exchange relationship between decisions and campaign dollars 
(McCall, 2003).  
A few other states, including Michigan, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Alabama and 
Nevada attempted to curb the influence of money and politics on judicial decisions by 
including nonpartisan elections in their system of judicial selection. Despite these 
reforms, we see a relationship between the campaign contributions by attorneys to an 
individual judge and the vote of that individual judge over time (Williams & Ditslear, 
2007). This evidence proves that a relationship of any kind demonstrates that the goals of 
never having a relationship are not effective.  
 
Conclusion 
 The evidence in this thesis supports my original hypotheses, that campaign 
contribution limits do not effectively reduce overall spending or prevent quid pro quo 
exchange relationships in the courtroom. Although the data helps confirm my hypothesis, 
it does not provide an alternative solution for campaign contribution limits. 
  So why do legislatures support campaign contribution limits if they are not 
effective (Geyh, 2003)? The idea of symbolic politics presented by Lyons (1999:286-
289), discusses the importance of the appearance of policies. Drawing from Mayhew, 
Lyons addresses two forms of symbolic politics; first, “statements of sentiment” and 
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second, “decisions which legally establish real policy objectives, and which potentially 
could have effects, but which have been designed not to achieve their objectives” (Lyons, 
1999:287). Campaign contribution limits satisfy more of these points. Referring back to 
Buckley, campaign contribution limits were put in place to make a statement about 
corruption in government. Shortly after, laws were instated to help regulate the amount of 
money spent by individuals per campaign to reduce the overall amount spent in elections. 
Although both of these actions were valid in their attempts to eliminate corruption and 
overall spending neither were successful. The symbolism behind these actions however is 
what makes the difference and satisfies the publics’ needs for legislative action. The mere 
idea of limiting the amount an individual can donate to a specific candidate helps 
eliminate the idea of corruption. Legislative figures need to appear to be concerned with 
the amount of money and corruption in elections by applying restriction that do not 
necessarily work however serve as a symbol of action to their constituents.  
Applying this idea to judicial elections, surveys show that people want the ability 
to elect their judges (Geyh, 2003). Allowing citizens to vote in a judicial election satisfies 
the people’s desire to be involved and have a voice in judicial selection. Because people 
want to elect their judges, contribution limits and other regulations are put in place to 
help prevent the appearance of corruption and/or impartiality toward one particular group 
or individual (Geyh, 2003). 
If campaign contribution limits are not effective at reducing spending or avoiding 
corruption, then what could be done to correct the system? The following subsections 
will discuss four possible solutions to restore the original intent of campaign contribution 
limits and make a recommendation. 
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a. Public Funding 
The first possible resolution to campaign contribution limits would be to remove them 
and publicly fund judicial elections (Skaggs et al., 2011). There are various types of 
public funding systems. (Daniel, 2000). The first option is full public funding, sometimes 
called a “Clean Money” or “Clean Elections” approach (Geyh, 2003:4). This would allow 
candidates to voluntarily receive a grant of public funding in exchange for a promise to 
refuse any outside contributions or spend more than the allotted amount on his/her 
campaign. There are stipulations the candidates would be required to raise some private 
funding to qualify for state aid. Because of this requirement it would eliminate anyone 
from receiving public aid (Daniel, 2000). On the other hand, candidates receiving “lump-
sum grants sufficient to run a campaign” opens many opportunities for individuals who 
may not be capable of raising funds otherwise. (Geyh, 2003:3)  
The second public funding option is partial public funding. Partial public funding 
would allow for candidates to receive a set amount of funding from the state to help run a 
campaign in exchange for a voluntary cap on overall spending (Daniel, 2000). Partial 
public funding has the potential to match any private donation as long as it is within the 
previously agreed upon amount (Geyh, 2003:3). Geyh (2003:3) mentions the availability 
to match funds would allow for a larger spectrum of candidates that would not otherwise 
have the means to raise such large amounts to consider candidacy. It is important to note 
that providing even just partial public funding in judicial elections would help eliminate 
the heavy dependence on private contributions, therefore helping to decrease the level of 
corruption of judicial candidates.  
Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits  32	  
Finally, the last option subsidizes contributors rather than candidates directly. A 
credit, refund and voucher system would provide some type of government 
reimbursement for contributors who donate to candidates, parties etc (Daniel, 2000). By 
offering tax refunds and other type of government reimbursements it does not directly 
help individual candidates but does provide government assistance to campaigns (Daniel, 
2000). 
Public funding helps reduce the total amount of money spent in an election and 
eliminate the idea of corruption and quid pro quo exchange relationships in the 
courtroom by donors. The problem with publicly funding elections is convincing people 
that it is worth the cost. Many people complain about what they see wasteful spending, 
particularly when it is targeted at certain groups or organizations. However, state judges 
fill an incredibly important role and should be separated from any type of outside 
pressure that may lead to impartiality in the courtroom.  
b. Eliminate Judicial Elections 
 
A second option is to eliminate campaign contribution limits by eliminating the 
option of electing judges altogether and only appointing judges. This option satisfies the 
goal of reducing the overall amount spent in elections but fails to do away with 
corruption. The appointment process for judges may reduce the threat of corruption at a 
state level but does not eliminate it. By allowing only the governor to appoint judges it 
opens the door for the person in office to have complete power over the judicial system 
with only minimal accountability to citizens. With the exception of the U.S. Supreme 
Court (where judges are granted life tenure), state judges have a higher chance of being 
selected on the basis of political factors or cronyism rather than because of their 
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qualifications. This possible solution would need to be carefully monitored to avoid 
further corruption due to the politics of appointing of judges.  
 
c. Merit Selection 
 
The third option is a combination of both appointing judges and elective selection. 
This alternative offers an interesting compromise to individuals on both sides of the issue.  
Merit selection would help eliminate the need for fundraising in an election. Selection 
would be made based of qualification and experience. The state courts would base off the 
U.S. Supreme Court method of merit selection. The governor would appoint a judge 
based off their resume followed by a legislative vote for final approval. The main 
difference between the U.S. Supreme Court and state court merit selection is state judges 
are not granted life tenure.  
State court judges face a retention vote from citizens.  Appointing judges and 
allowing them to face a yes/no vote satisfies both the people’s need to have a voice in 
judicial elections and have the qualified candidates selected by the governor. Without 
public funding this selection process has potential to cause serious problems with 
corruption once candidates face a yes/no citizen vote. Corporations have the ability to 
wait until selections from the governor are made and donate to that specific candidate in 
deriving from the goal of reducing overall spending in judicial campaigns. Although the 
amount of outside money collected in elections may not eliminate altogether it has a 
greater likelihood to be reduced under this system. Merit selection is a complex idea that 
would require a combination of public funding elections in order to effectively tackle the 
problems money poses in regular contestable elections.  
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d. No Limitations with Full Disclosure 
The last alternative is to eliminate campaign contribution limits and spending 
limits altogether but strictly enforces disclosure regulations. Opening everything up in 
this way could have adverse effects on the judiciary. According to Geyh, (2003) people 
feel that judicial elections are corrupt and contributions are heavily involved with this, 
mostly because of the lax disclosure laws that vary from state to state (Witko, 2005). 
Deregulating campaign finance laws and bringing more money into politics may helps 
inform citizens and make elections competitive, but could reinforce people’s beliefs that 
money influences judges’ decisions (Geyh, 2003).  
My recommendation to correct this problem of campaign contribution limits is to 
follow the route of public financing. As previously stated, every possible alternative to 
campaign contribution limits has pros and cons. There is no one fundamental system that 
can mend the problems created by elections and campaigns. Full public funding, 
however, helps eliminate the dependency on outside contributions minimizes corruption, 
and still allows citizens to hold judges accountable.  
As mentioned previous, judicial elections vary from state to state and not all 
judicial systems use elections to select their judges. Full public funding judicial elections 
is the best overall solution to fix the problems of corruption and reducing the overall 
amount spent in elections by reducing dependency on corporations and other private 
funding sources. Removing outside money from judicial elections allows for citizens to 
be involved with candidates and helps citizens pay closer attention to where their money 
is going, Candidates would need to meet strict qualifications to qualify for public 
funding. 
Effectiveness of Campaign Contribution Limits  35	  
These qualifying requirements help preserve the integrity of the 
ballot by ensuring that the candidates who are on the ballot have 
some public support. In short, they prevent every single candidate 
who wants to run for office from receiving public money (Daniel, 
2000:3). 
 
 
All states do not see the need for publicly funding candidates to run for a judicial 
seat. I would recommend a requirement across all states would help eliminate the need 
for contributions and donations in judicial elections. The problem raised by imposing 
such a strict qualification for judicial elections is that the federal government does not 
have the power to impose this requirement. Each state court functions independently of 
the Federal court based off individual state constitutions and rights, which regulate state 
court systems action. Logistics of this proposition would demand serious attention and 
analysis to convince citizens that publicly funding elections is the best alternative to 
electing their judges.  
Judicial elections are becoming of more importance and receiving recognizably 
more attention as contribution dollars continue to increase. Fixing the problems of 
contribution limits is not easy and although there are a number of alternative options, all 
have flaws. Future research could address, whether contribution limits matter at all, or if 
judges develop a natural sense of bias over time without and favoritism towards 
contributors?  
In sum, my research suggests that campaign contribution limits are not effectively 
reducing spending or preventing corruption in the courtroom. The results of this study 
suggest potential solutions to this problem by publicly funding judicial elections, and 
would help remove any type of outside influence on judicial candidates. There are a 
number of unanticipated problems yet to be addressed. Given that judicial elections have 
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seen increasingly high contributions in the past decade (specifically with contested 
elections) actions need to be taken to fix the problem that campaign contribution limits 
are no longer accomplishing. Judicial elections are some of the most vital elections that 
effect day-to-day lives of citizens. By publicly funding judicial elections across the 
United States it would allow citizens in general to feel a connection between the judicial 
systems and help them see the impacts from their decisions. People want a voice in 
elections. Publicly funding judicial elections satisfies the needs of the people as well as 
accomplishes the goals originally intended by campaign contribution limits.  
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Figure 1: Candidate Fundraising by Type of Election, 2009-10 
(Skagg et al., 2011) 
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Figure 2: Map of the U.S. According to Witko’s Contribution Restrictiveness Index 
 
 
STATE	   VALUE	  
ALABAMA	  	   1	  
ALASKA	   5	  
ARIZONA	   6	  
ARKANSAS	   4	  
CALIFORNIA	   4	  
COLORADO	   5	  
CONNECTICUT	   6	  
DELAWARE	   5	  
FLORIDA	   4	  
GEORGIA	   3	  
HAWAII	   5	  
IDAHO	   4	  
ILLINOIS	   0	  
INDIANA	   2	  
IOWA	   3	  
KANSAS	   4	  
KENTUCKY	   5	  
LOUSIANA	   4	  
MAINE	   2	  
MARYLAND	   4	  
MASSACHUSETTS	   5	  
MICHIGAN	   5	  
MINNESOTA	   6	  
MISSISSIPPI	   1	  
MISSOURI	   3	  
MONTANA	   5	  
NEBRASKA	   0	  
NEVADA	   6	  
NEW	  HAMPSHIRE	   6	  
NEW	  JERSEY	   4	  
NEW	  MEXICO	   0	  
NEW	  YORK	   5	  
NORTH	  CAROLINA	   5	  
NORTH	  DAKOTA	   4	  
OHIO	   5	  
OKLAHOMA	   5	  
OREGON	   1	  
PENNSYLVANIA	   4	  
RHODE	  ISLAND	   6	  
SOUTH	  CAROLINA	   4	  
SOUTH	  DAKOTA	   4	  
TENNESSEE	   6	  
TEXAS	   1	  
UTAH	   1	  
VERMONT	   3	  
VIRGINIA	   0	  
WASHINGTON	   4	  
WEST	  VIRGINIA	   5	  
WISCONSIN	   6	  
WYOMING	   5	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Table 1: Contributions to Candidates by Sector, 2009-10 
    Sector     Total Donations  
Lawyers/Lobbyists  $8,561,050 
Business $6,214,596 
Political Parties  $3,438,699 
Unknown $2,864,698 
Organized Labor  $261,430 
Candidate Contributions $1,878,836 
Other* $1,122,736 
Ideology/Single Issue $382,912 
Un-itemized Contributions $250,330 
Total  $27,022,287  
*Other includes: retired persons, civil servants, local or municipal elected officials, tribal 
governments, clergy, nonprofits, and military persons. (Skagg et al., 2011)  
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Table 2: Candidates Fundraising 2009-10* 
 
 
*Except as indicated, figures refer to 2010 elections, **2009 elections (Skagg et al., 
2011)  
Pennsylvania** $5,424,210 
Alabama $3,164,615 
Texas $2,951,719 
Ohio $2,865,847 
Michigan $2,342,827 
Arkansas $1,965,962 
Wisconsin** $1,624,343 
Washington $751,180 
Georgia $588,251 
West Virginia $306,447 
North Carolina $163,718 
Montana $160,174 
Minnesota $152,803 
Oregon $100,536 
Kentucky $3,350 
Total $22,565,982 
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 Table 3: Average amount raised Per Candidate/ Witko’s score  
  
(National Institute of Money in Politics, 2012) 
Partisan (P) or 
Non-Partisan 
(NP) Judicial 
Election 
State  Number of 
Candidates 
running for 
Office 
Average $$ 
amount 
raised Per 
Candidate  
>4               
Restrictive  
< 3 Non-
Restrictive  
NP  MN 4 $33856.75 6  
NP  OH * 4 $700713.25 5  
NP  MI *  5 $468982.6 5  
P  NC * 2 $207805.5 5  
P WV 2 153223.5 5  
NP MT 2 $60717 5  
P AR * 2 $459594.5 4  
NP  WA * 2 $298445 4  
NP  GA  3 $196083.33  3 
NP OR 3 $33793.33  1 
P AL * 6 $530834  1 
P TX *  9 $292492.55  1 
      
* = $200,000 
or > average 
raised per 
candidate 
  Total Fund-
Raising (3/4 
split) 
$297,917.26 $263,300.80 
   2/3 split $286,602.38 $285,706.63 
   4/5 split $270,883.10 $301,873.78 
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   Table 4: Relationship between Witko’s score and quid pro quo exchanges 
State  Study Found Relationship  
States with relax Contribution limits 
=Relationship 
Witko Score  
Wisconsin  No  (Cann 2002, Williams & 
Ditslear, 2007) 
6 
Nevada No (Bonneau & Cann, 2009) 6 
Michigan  Yes  (Bonneau & Cann 2009)  5 
Ohio Yes (Waltenburg & Lopeman, 
2007) 
5 
Kentucky Yes (Waltenburg & Lopeman, 
2007) 
5 
Georgia Yes (Cann, 2007)  3 
Texas No (Bonneau & Cann, 2009)  1 
Alabama  Yes (Waltenburg & Lopeman, 
2007) 
1 
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